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ment of a judgment lien is unnecessary in light of the available provisions
that bar the fraudulent use of homestead exemption to escape the payment
of just obligations. Regardless of when it is established, a true homestead
should receive the full benefits provided in the constitution.
Additionally, common sense dictates that refusing to allow the homestead
exemption to attach to a vested remainder because no right to present occupancy exists is nonsense when homestead status in fact is present. When
actual occupancy does exist, there is no sound reason for preventing the
benefits of homestead exemption from benefiting this particular estate inasmuch as mere occupancy in other situations has been held a sufficient basis
for a claim of homestead.
In light of the inequity and confusion often present in this area, the
need for legislative reform and clarification is readily apparent."", A more
literal and humane constitutional interpretation, benefiting those in greatest
need of the homestead exemption, is clearly the preferable approach.
RONALD YOUNG SCHRAM

GROSS NEGLIGENCE: EXCESSIVE SPEED AND TFIE
GUEST STATUTE
Hodges v. Helm, 222 So. 2d 418 (Fla. 1969)
Petitioner, a passenger in respondent's automobile, brought this action
for personal injuries received when respondent, driving over an unfamiliar
road at an excessive speed, failed to negotiate a curve, left the road, and
collided with a utility pole. Petitioner and respondent had stopped for "a
few beers" shortly before the accident., The trial court granted respondent's
motion for summary judgment based on petitioner's failure to establish a
prima facie showing of gross negligence, the degree of negligence required by
the Florida automobile guest statute.2 The Third District Court of Appeal
affirmed, 3 relying on the rule that excessive speed alone is not sufficient to
establish gross negligence under the guest statute.4

Petitioner alleged a con-

flict between the district court opinion and three decisions of the Second
38. Two other possible suggestions to eliminate the harshness exemplified in the instant
case come to mind: either prevent judgment liens from attaching to vested remainders or
allow the lien to attach to the remainder interest rather than the land. With either method
the termination of the life estate would create a new estate, free of liens, equally subject to
homestead occupancy or attachment.

1. 222 So. 2d 418, 420 (Fla. 1969).
2. FLA. STAT. §320.59 (1967) (requires the showing of gross negligence or willful and
wanton misconduct for an automobile guest to recover from his host).
3. Hodges v. Helm, 207 So. 2d 318 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1968).
4. Id. at 319; see Orme v. Burr, 157 Fla. 378, 392, 25 So. 2d 870, 878 (1946); O'Reilly v.
Sattler, 141 Fla. 770, 773, 193 So. 817, 818 (1940).
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District Court of Appeal 5 and on certiorari the Supreme Court of Florida
HELD, that excessive speed seldom occurs by itself and that the facts were
sufficient to establish a prima facie showing of gross negligence, thereby
precluding a summary judgment.6 The decision of the district court was
quashed and the case remanded.
From 1927 to 1939, twenty-seven states,7 including Florida," enacted automobile guest statutes. To recover from his host the guest passenger must
prove a higher degree of negligence than usual. The primary rationales center
around discouragement of suits by ungrateful guests against their hosts and
the protection of insurance companies from collusive lawsuits. 9 The distinction between gross and ordinary negligence has never been satisfactory and
has continually proved to be a bane to the courts.10
In the instant case the court at the outset acknowledged that the delimitation between gross negligence and other forms of negligence "is neither
conceptually satisfactory nor practically simple."" The court went on to say
that "[t]he effect of having to resolve matters within this framework has been
to force a case-by-case adjudication which admittedly has not satisfied the
2
desire of the Bench and the Bar for definitive guide lines."'
Gross negligence within the Florida guest statute was initially considered
to be synonymous with willful and wanton misconduct.'- In 1959 Carraway
v. Revell' 4 modified this by placing gross negligence between ordinary negligence and willful and wanton misconduct. In doing so, Carraway affirmed the
definition of ordinary negligence as conduct that a reasonable man might
possibly know would result in injury. Gross negligence then would be conduct
that a reasonable man would know would probably and most likely result
in injury; or, in other words, gross negligence would exist only where the
likelihood of injury were known to be imminent or "clear and present."' 5
Throughout the history of the Florida guest statute the courts have
maintained that excessive speed alone, while usually sufficient to establish
ordinary negligence, is not sufficient to constitute gross negligence.16 In

5. Reynolds v. Aument, 133 So. 2d 562 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1961); Douglass v. Galvin, 130
So. 2d 282 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1961); Myers v. Korbly, 103 So. 2d 215 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1958).
6. 222 So. 2d 418 (Fla. 1969).
7. Tipton, Florida'sAutomobile Guest Statute, 11 U. FLA. L. RiEv. 287, 288 (1959).
8. Fla. Laws 1937, ch. 18033, §1.
9. Note, Florida Automobile Guest Statute: What Constitutes Gross Negligence and
Willful and Wanton Misconduct?, 4 U. FLA. L. Rv.79 (1951).
10. See, e.g., Lascher, Hard Laws Make Bad Cases-Lots of Them (The California
Guest Statute), 9 SANTA CLARA LAW. 1 (1968); Tipton, note 7 supra; Comment, Judicial
Nullification of Guest Statutes, 41 S. CAL. L. Rlv. 884 (1968).

11. 222 So. 2d 418, 419 (Fla. 1969).
12. Id.
13. O'Reilly v. Sattler, 141 Fla. 770, 773, 193 So. 817 (1940); see Note, note 9 supra.
14. 116 So. 2d 16, 22 (Fla. 1959); see Tipton, Carraway v. Revell, Guest Law Landmark,
35 FLA. BJ. 369 (1961).
15. Carraway v. Revell, 116 So. 2d 16, 23 (Fla. 1959), quoting with approval Bridges v.
Speer, 79 So. 2d 679, 682 (Fla.1955).

16. E.g., O'Reilly v. Sattler, 141 Fla. 770, 773, 193 So. 817, 818 (1940).
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Dexter v. Green1 7 the court qualified this by adding that "all the circumstances
of each particular case-every act or omission entering into the particular
happening-must be considered in determining whether liability exists."
However, the sufficiency of the facts alleged to establish a prima facie case
of gross negligence is a question of law to be initially determined by the
trial judge. 8 There have been many cases where the "speed alone" rule has
been relied on in affirming summary judgments against plaintiffs under the
guest statute.1 9
Previously, a jury case was presented only when factual evidence of
negligence in addition to excessive speed was alleged .2-' This could be some
2 2
2
It
negligent act, such as intentional weaving ' or passing on the right.
could also be a negligent omission, for example, failure to heed some particularly dangerous circumstance such as knowledge of wet brakes.2 3 Prior knowledge of a preexisting condition is an important concept in distinguishing
guest statute cases. Knowledge of mechanical defects24 or knowledge of the
road and subsequent curves 25 have each been held, when coupled with
excessive speed, to establish a conscious disregard of a "clear and present"
danger. A composite of negligent actions must exist, creating express or
implied knowledge of danger. Dexter v. Green 213 concluded that while each
separate action by itself might not establish liability, the entire course of
conduct of the driver was such that she knew or should have known that
she was placing others in danger of injury. Yet, even presentation of a composite situation did not always create immunity from summary judgment.
In 1952 the Florida supreme court found eleven counts of negligenceincluding excessive speed, worn tires, inadequate brakes, driver fatigue, and
affected vision-insufficient to establish a prima facie case of gross negligence
27
and affirmed a summary judgment.
A composite situation is not presented in the instant case. Night driving
over an unfamiliar road does not constitute negligence. However, these are
the conditions that make speeding negligent. The posted speed limit anticipates these conditions, as well as the width of the road and the traffic. This
17. 55 So. 2d 548, 549 (Fla. 1951).
18. E.g., Cormier v. Williams, 148 Fla. 201, 205, 4 So. 2d 525, 526 (1941); Stone v.
Chichester, 198 So. 2d 108, 109 (lst D.C.A. Fla. 1969).
19. Ling v. Edenfield, 211 F.2d 705, 708 (5th Cir. 1954); Belick v. Sperry, 88 So. 2d 495,
497 (Fla. 1956); Ayers v. Morgan, 42 So. 2d 2, 4 (Fla. 1949); Koger v. Hollahan, 144 Fla. 779,
786, 198 So. 685, 688 (1940); O'Reilly v. Sattler, 141 Fla. 770, 773, 193 So. 817, 818 (1940);
Wilson v. Eagle, 120 So. 2d 207, 208 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1960); Dye v. Freeman, 116 So. 2d
647, 648 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1959); Vihon v. McCormick, 109 So. 2d 400, 402 (2d D.C.A. Fla.

1958), cert. denied, 122 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1959).
20. Cadore v.Karp, 91 So. 2d 806, 808 (Fla. 1956); Faircloth v. Hill, 85 So. 2d 870, 872
(Fla. 1956).
21. Cormier v. Williams, 148 Fla. 201, 203, 4 So. 2d 525, 526 (1941).
22. Bridges v. Speer, 79 So. 2d 679, 680 (Fla. 1955).
23. Martin v. Clum, 142 So. 2d 149, 150 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1962).
24.

Webster v. Kemp, 164 So. 2d 814, 816 (Fla. 1964).

25. Weiss v. Kamen, 67 So. 2d 761 (Fla. 1953).
26.

55 So. 2d 548, 549 (Fla. 1951).

27. DeWald v. Quarnstrom, 60 So. 2d 919, 920 (Fla. 1952).
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should not be considered a composite situation, and speed alone, without other
factual evidence of negligence, is not gross negligence. In comparison, however, driving a defective automobile at any speed is negligence. To do so at
an excessive speed may be gross negligence. This additional element is the
key distinction in the "excessive speed alone" rule.
The only possible additional condition presented in the instant case is
that of consumption of intoxicating beverages by respondent. By implication
the trial court found it insufficient to complete the composite. The supreme
court does not deal with it directly. In the past, however, the question of
alcohol consumption presented an interesting dilemma for plaintiffs. In prior
speed cases, if consumption of alcohol were alleged to be moderate, as in the
instant case, 28 the courts found it insufficient to establish a prima facie case of
gross negligence, and invoked the "speed alone" rule.29 In one instance a
district court of appeal stated: "Such evidence could have no effect other than
to open the minds of the jurors to improper speculative excursions outside
the issues developed by the pleadings and proofs." 30 On the other hand, if
it were established that consumption was of a degree to create a dangerous
situation, and if the plaintiff knew of this condition (as from joining in
defendant's revelry) recovery was barred because of plaintiff's assumption of
risk. 31 There was no middle ground on which recovery might be granted.
By reversing the district court of appeal the supreme court has effectively
eliminated the "excessive speed alone" concept without expressly saying so.
Yet, if speed is "the factor most often contributing to the confusion" in
proving gross negligence, 32 what purpose is served by perpetuation of the
now emasculated rule of "speed alone"? Since the present case is sufficiently
devoid of distinguishing characteristics, it will provide "conflict" 33 with any
future district court of appeal affirmance of a summary judgment for defendant wherever the issue of speed is raised. This needlessly compounds the
judicial process.
The present case is not concerned solely with excessive speed or with the
limited application of a "speed alone" rule of law. Rather, it reflects the
continuing dissatisfaction with guest statutes in general. 34 Today it seems
unjust for an injured party to be denied recovery because of the relationship
of guest to host. The vast majority of drivers are covered by liability insurance and the uninsured motorist, supposedly protected by the guest statutes,
is now looked upon with disfavor. Nor is the denial of recovery to all, on
the basis of a conjectural possibility of collusion, totally acceptable. The
28. Respondent's Brief on Jurisdiction at 2, Hodges v. Helm, 222 So. 2d 418 (Fla. 1969)
(two-and-one-half beers).
29. Herring v. Eiland, 81 So. 2d 645, 646 (Fla. 1955); Dye v. Freeman, 116 So. 2d 647
(2d D.C.A. Fla. 1959); cf. Orme v. Burr, 157 Fla. 378, 380, 25 So. 2d 870, 872

(1946).
30. LeFevre v. Bear, 113 So. 2d 390, 392 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1959).
31. Mascerenas v. Johnson, 280 F.2d 49, 51 (5th Cir. 1960); Henley v. Carter, 63 So. 2d
192 (Fla. 1953). See also Godinez v. Soares, 216 Cal. App. 2d 145, 30 Cal. Rptr. 767 (1963).
32. 222 So. 2d 418, 419 (Fla. 1969).
33. FLA. CONsr. art. V, §4; FLA. APP. R. 4.5c.
34. FLA. STAT. §320.59 (1967).
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guest statutes do not operate in a vacuum. If the purposes for enacting guest
legislation have deteriorated, then the legislatures should act accordingly. Yet,
apparently under the persistent and effective lobbying on the part of liability
35
insurance companies, guest statutes remain in force.
Although it is said by some that the distinction between degrees of negligence is too complex to be left to the jury, G it is perhaps in the face of
legislative inaction that the court has now concluded: 37
[W]e live in an age where few persons are not in daily contact with
the operation of an automobile either as operators or as passengers.
Certainly a jury composed of citizens experienced in the ordinary
affairs of life, and properly guided by the instruction of the court,
should have been allowed to decide whether the respondent's driving
... was within, or without, the confines of the Guest Statute's limitations.
The court seems to be saying that justice may best be served when the question of the degree of negligence under the guest statute is placed before the
jury for adjudication. If such is the case, excessive speed in any context or any
other singly alleged act of negligence should provide a jury question.
Given the guest statute, the distinction between ordinary and gross
negligence, and the resulting confusion, an open question remains as to what
discretion the trial judge should retain in taking a case from the jury. The
present case unfortunately provides no positive answers. Carraway v. Revell 3s
placed gross negligence between ordinary negligence and willful and wanton
misconduct. By viewing negligence as a continuum, ordinary negligence could
be said to set a lower limit to gross negligence. To be grossly negligent one
must at least be guilty of ordinary negligence. Taking this to its logical
conclusion, it could be held that as a matter of law a prima facie showing
of ordinary negligence must be established in order to preclude a summary
judgment. The present case contains this implication. Thus, the trial judge
would have an adequate and workable measure of sufficiency at law and the
final adjudication would be left to the jury. This would go a long way toward
alleviating guest statute confusion and inconsistency at both the trial and
appellate levels of litigation.
JAMES

35.

C.

BLECKE

W. PROssirx, THE LAw oF TORTS 190-91 (3d ed. 1964).

36. 222 So. 2d 418, 420 (Fla. 1969).
37. Id.
38.

116 So. 2d 16, 22 (Fla. 1959).
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